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We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric
than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries.
A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces more
the electoral appeal of capitalism than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries
is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in their country are also
more likely to lean left ideologically (and to declare support for a more intrusive government in economic
matters). Finally, we present a model explaining the corruption-left connection.  It exploits the fact
that an act of corruption is more revealing about the fairness type of a rich capitalist than of a poor
bureaucrat. After observing corruption, voters who care about fairness react by increasing taxes and
moving left. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs
















Casual examination of right wing political rhetoric reveals large differences across countries. Right 
wing parties in poor countries extol the virtues of capitalism less often than their counterparts in 
rich countries. Instead, they appear tolerant of government intervention to regulate markets and of 
subsidies to contain income disparities. An intriguing possibility is that few voters in poor countries 
want to have a US-style capitalist system. Since economists believe that such a system is the most 
conducive to growth, a puzzle is, why isn't capitalism, as a way to get a country out of poverty, a 
more attractive idea in poor countries? 
 
One potential explanation for these patterns in the data is cultural differences across poor and rich 
countries. For example, it has been argued that capitalism spread in the countries that are rich today 
because the prevailing religious culture approved of success and the accumulation of individual 
wealth, whereas in today’s poor countries other cultures (such as Catholicism) stood in the way of 
capitalism.
1 An alternative explanation, economic in nature, is that voters in poor countries are 
choosing left wing governments to redistribute the little income there is. More inequality, in this 
view, moves average income up relative to the median, and may introduce a desire for redistribution. 
A number of authors, however, have emphasized that, at least amongst advanced industrial nations 
more unequal countries seem to distribute less, not more.
2 And since countries can move to the 
center, and redistribute within a market economy, it does not explain why many countries loose faith 
in the private sector altogether.  
 
A more promising hypothesis is suggested by taking at face value what political parties say. Simple 
inspection of the traditional platforms of established parties, such as the PT in Brazil and the PRI in 
Mexico, reveals that corruption of the capitalist class is often invoked when justifying a more 
paternalistic role of government. Thus, a striking difference in the rhetoric of politicians that support 
redistribution across rich and poor countries is how often those in the latter group make reference 
to corruption. Thus, in the main part of the paper we explore empirical evidence bearing on the 
hypothesis that support for left wing parties originates in perceptions of corruption. We discuss 
                                                 
1 In some extreme cases, wealth was indicative of a person’s moral standing (and likely after-life performance). A classic 
reference for the role of cultural affinities in the spread of capitalism is Weber (1958). For discussions and evidence, see 
Iannaccone (1998), Grier (1997), La Porta et al (1997).   3
three types of evidence. The first is simply a reinterpretation of the work of Djankov et al (2002) on 
the regulation of entry. They find that countries with more regulation on the entry of firms, in terms 
of delays and money spent in the process, also have more corruption. This, we argue, is also 
consistent with the idea that corruption invites regulation (and other left wing policies). The second 
type of evidence concerns corruption levels aggregated at the country level. We show that there is a 
positive correlation within countries between the total amount of corruption today and how left the 
government becomes in later years. Finally, analysis of subjective data within countries reveals that 
individuals who believe that there is more corruption are also more likely to be in favor of more 
government intervention in the economy. Interestingly, there is no evidence that corruption is 
correlated with non-economic attributes of ideology. 
 
In the final part of the paper we present a simple model that can help explain why people who see 
more corruption in government are more left wing. It is based on the idea that corruption reduces 
the “moral legitimacy” of business because voters are concerned with fairness. When they observe 
corruption, voters react by moving left, even if this is costly to them, much as there are rejections of 
positive offers in the ultimatum game.
3 There is a negative externality in the sense that the existence 
of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the general appeal of capitalism. 
 
Our paper builds on the literature studying the role of the social contract and how economic 
organization is built on beliefs (e.g., de Tocqueville (1955), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Lipset (1979), 
Rokeach (1973), Feldman (1988), Inglehart (1990), Denzau and North (1994), Putterman (1996), 
inter alia). Two important papers are Piketty (1995) and Benabou (2000). The former shows that an 
initial distribution of beliefs concerning the importance of effort in determining performance can 
lead to two different types of equilibria, one (the other) with low (high) taxes and a belief, which 
holds in reality, that individual effort is (is not) important in determining income.
4 Benabou (2000), 
on the other hand, shows that for a class of interventions that increase output, such as public 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Peltzman (1980). In section I we show that inequality is positively correlated with the election of right wing parties. 
See also work on inequality and growth (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996)). 
3 See, in particular, the evidence in Hoffman et al (1994) and Ruffle (1998) whereby performance on a skill testing contest 
is positively related to earnings in ultimatum and dictator games. 
4 A recent paper by Benabou and Tirole (2002) shows how multiple equilibria can arise out of a distribution of beliefs 
when individuals have self-control problems. One advantage over Piketty’s approach is that beliefs have more “texture” 
in the sense that some individuals will believe that mainly luck determines performance and will still want to persuade 
themselves that effort is important. Hochschild (1981) discusses this and other aspects of American beliefs on   4
education when capital markets are imperfect, multiple steady states can arise. Finally, Alesina and 
Angeletos (2002) show how fairness can influence the choice of taxes: if a society believes that luck 
or corruption (rather than effort) determine wealth, it will choose high (rather than low) taxes, thus 
distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustaining. Putterman, Roemer and Sylvestre 
(1998) and Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) review the contributions to this growing literature. 
In our model, different beliefs on the importance of corruption determine how much government 
intervention voters will support. Since such interventions increase corruption levels, it can be shown 
that this class of models also has the potential for multiple equilibria. 
 
We also draw on the corruption literature.
5 Some authors have emphasized how corruption has 
undermined popular support for economic reforms.
6 Our work can be seen as formalizing these 
ideas in the context of general economic ideology (and not to views solely about reforms), exploiting 
the distinction between two different forms of corruption: extortion and capture. A number of 
economists have shown how corruption may reduce growth (see Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shelifer 
and Vishny (1993); for empirical evidence see Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995)). An early 
paper by Andvig and Moene (1990) describes how multiple equilibria in corruption can arise. Work 
in this literature has also studied how government interventions may improve social welfare even 
when corruption originates in these very same interventions (see Banerjee (1997), Ades and Di Tella 
(1997), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) and Djankov et al (2003)). An implication of this approach is 
that it may be hard to justify interventions in very poor countries that cannot afford to pay the high 
salaries necessary to control corruption, a point made explicitly in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). 
Our paper is closer to Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). They explain the rise of regulation in America as 
the efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age, when the 
scale of business can be assumed to have grown (see also Djankov et al (2003)). Finally, a large 
literature has studied how countries may get to have intrusive regulations (Stigler (1971), Peltzman 
(1976), Becker (1983), Kroszner and Stratmann (1999), inter alia), or bad institutions that retard 
growth (e.g., North and Thomas (1973), De Long and Shleifer (1993), Acemoglu, Johnson and 
                                                                                                                                                             
distributive justice. See also Klugel and Smith (1986) and Ladd and Bowman (1998). In the same spirit, we try to 
incorporate how perceptions of corruption are a component of beliefs about distributive justice. 
5 A large literature in political science has focused on the determinants of legitimacy in political representation. The 
literature on the legitimacy of commercial institutions is more limited, but see the discussion in Rose-Ackerman (2002). 
della Porta (2000) and Seligson (2002) discuss empirical evidence based on exposure to corruption. See also Dahl (1956), 
Huntington (1968), and Weatherford (1992). Political scientists have also studied how party identification moves over 
time in the US (see, for example, Jennings and Markus (1984)).   5
Robinson (2001), inter alia), or get to choose bad policies (e.g., Alesina and Drazen (1990), Fenandez 
and Rodrik (1990), inter alia). But in these models voters want to have good policies (and capitalism), 
and there is some impediment to their adoption. We are focused on the case where voters do not 
want capitalism. 
 
Section I motivates the paper with (new) evidence consistent with the idea that poor countries elect 
governments that tend to use left-wing rhetoric. Section II explores the empirical connection 
between corruption and ideological position in three settings: across countries, within countries over 
time, and across individuals (within countries). Section III presents a model where the observation 
of corruption changes citizens’ beliefs about a characteristic of capitalists (their fairness level) and 
increases the desire for government intervention. Section IV concludes.  
 
I. Motivation: Anecdotal Evidence on Political Rhetoric across Countries  
 
The claim that political parties in poor countries are less capitalist than those in rich countries, which 
serves as motivation for this paper, is not well documented. There is some suggestive historical 
evidence available. For example, a standard informal justification for military coups in Latin America 
in the 1970's is that they were the only way that right wing ideas could get to be implemented, given 
their small electoral appeal.
7 The case of Argentina, where the center-left Radical and Peronist 
parties have alternated in government during the last century, is another case in point.
8 A more 
systematic approach would involve using data on the pre-electoral rhetoric of political parties around 
the world. We are, however, unaware of the availability of data on political rhetoric across countries. 
An examination of voting records of legislators could be a useful proxy, but unfortunately, data with 
that level of detail are not available beyond OECD countries. Furthermore, politicians sometimes 
change their “ideology” once in office (and we are interested in their proposed policies while they are 
running for office. See Cukierman and Tommasi (1996). Interestingly, in the one systematic study of 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Stiglitz (2000). 
7 See, for example, Jauretche (1947). The involvement of the "Chicago boys" with the military dictatorships of Chile and 
Argentina is sometimes discussed in these terms (e.g., Green (1995)). An alternative explanation is that some degree of 
authoritarianism is consistent with economic liberalism when pressure groups break the law (see Skidelsky (1988)). See 
section I below for the general patterns in the dictatorship and ideology data across countries. 
8 Peronists are often labeled right wing given the role of fascism in shaping Peron’s ideology. Yet, over the last century, 
the labor share has been highest with Peronist administrations and the Peronist march intones “the Peronist lads will fight 
capital”. Likewise it is claimed that the Menem administration in the 1990’s turned right wing, which is plausible, but does 
not deny the fact that Menem was elected on a populist platform that included a massive wage hike or “salariazo”.   6
this issue available for non-OECD countries, all the recorded cases of switches involve populist 
parties becoming more right wing (see, for example, Stokes (2001)). 
 
I.a. Data Source on Capitalist Rhetoric across Countries 
Closer to our needs is the data set compiled by Beck et al (2001). They use a two-step approach. 
First, they record the party identification of a country’s political leaders. These include the chief 
executive (prime minister or president), the largest government party and the three largest parties in 
the government coalition. Second, they classify the parties following preferences regarding greater or 
less state control of the economy – the standard left-right scale. This is inferred by their name and 
by the information contained in a set of sources. Thus, parties that contain terms such as 
“conservative” or “Christian democratic” in their names are classified as right-wing. Similarly, they 
are classified as left-wing if their name includes the words communist, socialist, or social democratic. 
The category center is reserved for parties that are called centrist. Parties that cannot be classified in 
these categories are recorded as “other” and not included in our study (these are frequently parties in 
non-competitive electoral systems).
9 When the orientation of the party was not immediately obvious 
from the name, Beck et al checked a set of sources, again with the criteria of greater or less state 
control of the economy. Parties are classified as center if these sources reveal them to advocate the 
strengthening of private enterprise but also to support a redistributive role for government. These 
sources included The Europa Handbook and Banks’ Political Handbook of the World as well as Political 
Parties of Africa and the Middle East: A Reference Guide (1993), Political Parties of Eastern Europe, Russia and 
the Successor States: A Reference Guide (1994) as well as http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/parties.htm a 
website maintained by Agora Telematica which provides short definitions of parties. In the rare case 
sources disagreed, Beck et al noted it in their database (and we exclude them here). The sample 
includes a maximum of 136 countries over the period 1975-97.  
 
I.b. Some Results 
Perhaps the simplest measure to study initially is the color of the party to which the chief executive 
is affiliated. In 1997 there are data on 105 countries. If we divide this group of countries by income 
within the sample (real purchasing power) we find that, within the richest third, 44% are classified as 
left, 3% as center and 53% as right wing. Within the poorest third, 63% are classified as left, 6% are 
                                                 
9 Beck et al also code governments as nationalistic, regional, rural and religious. They state “These dimensions were chosen 
because they do not necessarily correlate with each other: religious or nationalistic parties adopt both left and right wing economic policies;…”   7
center and 31% are right. If we use the world distribution of income, which gives us 49 (25) 
countries in the top (bottom) third, we find that within the richest group countries are evenly split 
with 24 left and 24 classified as right. Within the poorest group, 68% of countries are classified as 
left, 8% as center and 24% as right. Moving to a simple table of frequencies for the full 1975-97 
sample presents similar results. There are 2,311 country/year observations. Of the 488 for OECD 
countries, 39% (50%) have a chief executive affiliated to a party classified as left (right) by Beck et al. 
Of the 1,823 observations for Non-OECD countries, 61% (33%) are classified as left (right). 
 
Table A1 in appendix 1 adopts a definition of government that follows more closely electoral appeal 
(as opposed to political maneuvering) based on the color of the largest government party (rather 
than of the chief executive). It partitions the sample symmetrically by thirds on the basis of within-
sample income. Again the data suggest that successful right wing parties are more frequent in rich 
countries. Their frequency relative to left wing governments is monotonically increasing in income. 
This is not affected when the data are analyzed at two points in time in Table A2. Although during 
the early part of the sample (1975-80) left wing governments were more common than later on 
(1992-97), in both periods right wing governments are relatively more common in rich countries. 
 
Table A3 compares three alternative definitions of color of government available from Beck et al, 
chief executive, largest government party and 3 main parties in government. We also assign a 
cardinal scale to the parties (assigning 1 to right wing parties, 0 to center parties and -1 to left wing 
parties) so as to simplify comparisons. For all definitions of government a simple t-test strongly 
suggests that right wing parties are more common in richer countries. In other words, the data give a 
similar picture to that presented in Table A1.
10 This is still true even when we weigh data on party 
ideology by the proportion of the total available seats obtained. 
 
Other variables may affect the relationship between government ideology and level of development. 
An obvious candidate is inequality. Given the low quality of the data it is best to start with raw 
frequencies of political color and partition the sample in two using data on the Gini coefficient from 
Deininger and Squire (1996). See Table A4. Availability of inequality data limits the sample 
                                                 
10 There do not seem to exist significant trends over time. For example, using the “Chief Executive” definition the biggest 
difference between OECD and non-OECD occurred in the 1980’s (difference equals 0.57), while the smallest was in the 
1990’s (difference equals 0.21). In all periods the OECD had significantly more right-wing governments.    8
(asymmetrically with respect to income). Again poor countries are more left wing and, if anything, 
more unequal countries seem to be more right wing.  
 
The previous tables treat each country/year observation in our data set as independent. However 
since our data include repeated observations on the same country over time it is of interest to relax 
this assumption and give more weight to changes in government. A simple approach is to look at 
random effects regressions that allow for serial correlation in the error term.
11 Table A5 reports the 
results. We also include other controls. We include Freedom, a country's level of political rights as 
measured by Freedom House, a control for whether the countries were experiencing civil war (from 
Doyle and Sambanis (2000)) and a control for inequality (see appendix 2 for data definitions). This is 
desirable given the correlation between redistribution, democracy and inequality predicted in 
theories of the growth of government (Peltzman (1980)), of the Kuznets curve and extension of the 
franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)) and in theories of capital-skill complementarities during 
development (Galor and Moav (2003) and Galor et al (2003)). Data availability on these new controls 
reduces the sample to 80 countries. For clarity we also eliminate countries in the Soviet block prior 
to 1990 (so that only 75 remain) although the results are unaffected by this choice. 
 
Rich countries (i.e., in the top third of the income distribution in our original sample) are again 
associated with more right wing governments across all definitions, even after controlling for other 
variables that could be associated with different color of government. It is worth noting that more 
unequal countries tend to have more right wing parties. This point, which has been made informally 
contrasting the US and European experiences, is the starting point of Piketty (1995) and Benabou 
(2000) and, to our knowledge, has not been documented before. The coefficient on War indicates a 
positive and statistically weak association between right-wing government and there being a civil 
conflict in the corresponding country. Results remain similar if we exclude the smallest 25% of 
countries based on population size. 
 
There is no correlation between Freedom and the ideological orientation of the government. One 
could still argue that controlling for democratic differences in this way is insufficient to study the 
robustness of the left/poor correlation and that one should only look at countries with perfect degrees 
                                                 
11 The need to eliminate the role of serial correlation may seem obvious. But rational voters in a democracy typically 
intend the government to stay the full length of the term.   9
of freedom. This would be misleading for two reasons. First, countries that are perfectly democratic 
that are not in the richest third are still very rich relative to the rest of the sample. Thus, we would 
be studying if capitalism flows to countries that are rich (but not in the richest third). Second and 
more importantly, our Freedom variable concerns how democratic are governments once in power, not 
if they got there through democratic means. Thus, a finding that dictatorships lean left more often 
than right would still be consistent with right wing parties being unattractive to voters. The reason 
behind the left/authoritarian correlation may be found in the left-wing view of pressure groups (the 
“forces of reaction”) as using violence and misinformation through the media (and not just offering 
bribes). Thus, repression of individual rights is necessary to carry out socialist reforms and socialist 
countries score low on Freedom (Fidel Castro is an actual case of a left-wing politician that is initially 
popular and then justifies becoming increasingly autocratic in these terms).  
 
II. The Link between Corruption and Ideological Orientation: Three Pieces of Evidence 
 
As noted in the introduction, informal evidence suggests that the rhetoric of left wing parties in less 
developed countries is closely connected to corruption. See also Jauretche (1947). In this section we 
explore evidence bearing on the hypothesis that the resistance to adopting capitalism in the third 
world is correlated with the public’s perception of corruption. We propose three pieces of evidence. 
The first comes from re-examining the evidence on the regulation of entry presented in Djankov et 
al (2002). The second comes from examining the relationship between aggregate levels of corruption 
and political orientation of government within countries (using the Beck et al (2001) data set). And 
the third piece of evidence comes from examining subjective opinions on corruption and the role of 
government across individuals using World Values Survey data. 
  
II.a. A Reinterpretation of "The Regulation of Entry" by Djankov et al (2002)  
In their comprehensive study, Djankov et al collect data on the procedures regulating firm entry 
across countries, including the number of procedures, the time for putting the firm into operation, 
and total cost.
12 They report that they cannot reconcile the evidence available with public interest 
theories of regulation. Instead their evidence is consistent with "tollbooth" theories whereby 
regulations are put into place to allow rent extraction by bureaucrats. For example, a basic finding is 
                                                 
12 The procedures include screening (to certify business competence, a clean criminal record, check name for uniqueness, 
etc), tax related requirements, safety as well as environment related requirements. See Table I, in Djankov et al (2002).   10
that the number of procedures enters positively in bad-performance regressions (i.e., where the 
dependent variable is water pollution, deaths from intestinal infection, etc). They then present 
corruption regressions where the number of procedures, time and cost measures all enter positively. 
They state, "While the data are noisy, none of the results support the predictions of the public interest theory" (page 
25), favoring instead the "tollbooth theory". Lastly they find that lack of political rights in the 
country enter positively in regulation regressions (dependent variable=number of procedures). Thus, 
regulation is heavy in autocratic countries, "consistent with the public choice theory that sees regulation as a 
mechanism to create rents for the politicians and the firms they support" (page 34). 
 
This evidence can also help explain why capitalist ideas don’t flow to poor countries. When business 
people are perceived to be failing to deliver on their social contract, either because they are polluting 
the environment or because they are corrupting bureaucrats, offended citizens vote for more 
controls in the forms of more regulations. A simple way to distinguish this explanation from the 
“tollbooth” theory is to look at evidence at the individual level. A finding that people who perceive 
corruption to be widespread also want more government regulation would be difficult to explain if 
regulations were simply facilitating rent extraction by bureaucrats. This kind of evidence is discussed 
in section II.c. As for the finding that autocrats regulate more, there seems to be an equally 
appealing interpretation to the one proposed by Djankov et al, namely that they are passing these 
laws and regulations to "buy" the legitimacy that they lack from a democratic electoral process. 
Remember that their paper focuses on written regulations. By increasing the amount of written 
regulations, more autocratic leaders strengthen the bargaining position of bureaucrats vis a vis firms. 
But why would they do that? One possibility is that they are simply trying to buy the support of the 
bureaucracy. But this approach would risk alienating the - typically - more powerful business 
community. A more plausible story, then, is that autocrats are regulating as a way to discipline 
business and get the support of the general population, because as Djankov et al emphasize, few 





                                                 
13 Djankov et al argue that “dictators need the political support of various interest groups, and use the distortionary policies to favor their 
friends”. They then assert “the choice of distortionary policy is not mitigated by public pressure since he faces no elections.” (page 28). An 
alternative explanation is that there is little exit and at the same time equilibrium industry profits with regulation are so 
much higher that they compensate for the firm’s lower bargaining power.    11
II.b. Corruption and Ideology at the Aggregate level 
A simple approach to see if corruption is playing a role in the appeal of capitalism is to examine the 
within-country correlation of measures of aggregate corruption and ideology of the government. 
Table B looks at the correlation between the Beck et al (2001) measure of government ideology and 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index introduced into economics by 
Knack and Keefer (1995). The corruption variable is available since 1984 and indicates the opinion 
of analysts on each country regarding how widespread is corruption. We focus on OLS fixed effect 
panel regressions and three different definitions of color of government (chief executive, largest 
government party and three main government parties). The results show that high levels of 
corruption are correlated with less right wing governments (with a three year lag), across all 
definitions of government. The relationship is statistically significant. Columns (4) and (5) show that 
these correlations are robust to weighting the largest government party and three main government 
parties by the proportion of seats that each of them controls. The analysis is not designed to deal 
convincingly with problems of endogeneity, so it has to remain illustrative. (As a small step towards 
addressing these issues, we have lagged the right-hand variables three years).
14 If we also control for 
an index of development in the above regressions (for example, GDP per capita adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) then the coefficients on corruption become more negative and significant 
across all specifications. Interacting the level of corruption with the level of income in these 
regressions gives a positive and significant interaction term, indicating that the correlation between 
corruption and how left the government is gets larger in size at low levels of income. This is 
consistent with the idea that a given level of corruption is more effective in moving the electorate 
left in poor countries. 
 
II.c. Evidence on Individual Beliefs from the World Values Survey 
The data for this section come from the World Values Survey Series (WVS, see Appendix 2). A large 
random sample of individuals are interviewed and asked a series of questions to "contribute to a better 
understanding of what people all over the world believe and want out of life". The 1995-7 wave includes one 
survey in each of 51 nations that asks a question on corruption. It asks, "How widespread do you think 
bribe taking and corruption is in this country?"  The four relevant response categories are: 1. Almost no 
public officials are engaged in it.  2. A few public officials are engaged in it. 3. Most public officials are engaged in it. 
                                                 
14 We also examined the opposite timing. Granger causality tests comfortably reject the hypothesis that corruption is 
correlated with lagged left wing government. Results are available upon request.   12
4. Almost all public officials are engaged in it. Accordingly, four dummy variables capturing each of these 
responses are created: Perception of Corruption – almost none, - few officials, - most officials, - almost all officials. 
 
Table C1 uses this variable to study ideological inclination. This is possible because individuals also 
answer a question on ideological self-placement: "In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" The interviewer then shows a scale 
with numbers 1 to 10 written down with the word "Left" below the number 1 and the word "Right" 
below the number 10.  Accordingly, the variable Right Wing is created taking the values 1-10. A total 
of 51,810 people across 48 countries answer both questions of interest.  
 
Regressions (1-2) in Table C1 present ordered probit regressions, of the form: 
 
Rightij  = a Perception of Corruption ij + b Personal Controlsij + Countryj + εij 
 
where Rightij is the ideological position of individual i living in country j, Perception of Corruptionij is the 
perception of corruption of individual i living in country j, while εij is a standard error term (i.i.d) and 
Countryj is a country dummy. We also include a large set of personal controls, Personal Controlsij 
(including gender, age, marital status, income, education, country of residence and employment 
status of the respondent). When we use all this information the sample reduces further to 37,278 
people across 43 nations.  
 
Regression (1) in Table C1 shows that individuals who perceive corruption to be widespread are less 
likely to identify themselves as right-wingers. Regression (2) shows that the result survives the 
inclusion of personal controls. They enter with the expected signs: people on higher income, men 
and the self-employed all tend to lean ideologically towards the right. In both regressions the effect 
of Perception of Corruption is monotonic and large. To obtain a measure of the size of the effect, note 
that a person who perceives corruption to be widespread (almost all officials engaged in it) is 
predicted to move toward the left-end of the scale by 0.14 units of the underlying continuous 
variable relative to the base category (Almost no public officials are engaged in it). The size of this effect is 
bigger than a fall from the top to the bottom income quintile, and suggests that an aggregate 
corruption shock of this size would move 4.5% of the electorate to the left (i.e., from an even split 
to 54.5% vote left and 45.5% vote right). A similar estimate, although smaller in size, obtains when   13
we limit the sample to countries in the OECD. This again supports the idea that the left-corruption 
connection is stronger in poorer countries.  
 
Although the strength of the average effect is striking, there are examples suggesting that the effects 
vary in intensity depending on the historical circumstances. Indeed, the pro-market reforms of the 
early 1990’s in Argentina were sometimes justified by the high levels of corruption in the state-
owned companies. This suggests that it is worth comparing countries that differ in their history of 
interventionist governments. Specifically we compare the effect of observing corruption on 
ideological inclination for countries with different starting ideology. This is done by including the 
variable Largest Government Party (equal to one when the largest government party is right and –1 
when it is left, see Appendix 2) averaged over the previous five years into regression (2), as well as an 
interaction term. This leaves a sample of 33,244 individuals in 35 countries. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. Specifically, the coefficient on perception of corruption (cardinalized 
with equal distance between the categories) is –0.033 (s.e. 0.016), the coefficient on Largest 
Government Party (right) equals 0.198 (s.e. 0.080), while the interaction between Largest Government 
Party (right) and Perception of Corruption equals –0.055 (s.e. 0.020). Thus, individuals who perceive 
there to be more corruption within the country are more likely to be left and on average people are 
more right in countries that have had a right wing government over the past five years. Importantly, 
the observation of corruption turns people left more when the government has been ideologically to 
the right. Similar results obtain with other definitions of government ideology (Chief Executive and 
Three Main Government Parties). 
 
This suggests, more generally, that corrupt acts differ in the way they are perceived by the electorate.  
The corruption literature has suggested that there are two different types of corruption: extortion 
and capture. The former is initiated by a bureaucrat on a firm that would otherwise be honest; the 
latter is initiated by a firm on a bureaucrat (or politician) that typically has to change the law to favor 
the firm.
15 The WVS includes the question "Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a 
few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" The possible answers 
are 1. Run for all the people and 2. Run by a few big interests. We define the variable Captured as those 
answering the second option. Regression (3) includes Captured together with Perception of Corruption in 
                                                 
15 Legally, a firm that pays up under extortion is not guilty of bribery. Often, however, a firm that is being extorted can 
also obtain favors from the bureaucrat (that harms competitors), so the distinction is blurred in practice.   14
our ideology regressions. The coefficient on Perception of Corruption after controlling for Captured 
provides us with one rough measure of the extent to which individuals see corruption of the 
extortion variety. The effect of Perception of Corruption is smaller, reflecting the high correlation 
between the measures of the two types of corruption. Interestingly, the effect is negative and 
significant suggesting that corruption, even of the extortion variety, moves people left. 
 
These findings introduce two restrictions on the theoretical explanations that we derive below 
(Section III). First, the effects should vary with the history of intervention in the country. Observing 
corruption in an interventionist environment has a smaller effect than observing it in an 
environment where taxes and intervention are low. Second, corruption even of the extortion type 
(typically involving low-level bureaucrats) sometimes makes people upset with firms. More generally, 
these results are difficult to rationalize using the results in Djankov et al (2002). These authors show 
that the "tollbooth" theory of regulation performs better than the "public interest" theory. Our 
results suggest, however, that the tollbooth theory cannot be the full story. If bureaucrats are putting 
in regulation to extract bribes, then why would it be that rational people who observe corruption 
want more intervention? In section III below, we develop a simple theory of regulation based on the 
idea of the "legitimacy" of business. 
 
Robustness: Perceptions of Corruption and Economic Attitudes 
People may have different views on what they define as left and what they define as right. The 
differences that occur across countries are absorbed into the country dummies included in our 
regressions. It is still of interest to examine the connection between corruption and the various 
components of ideology. Previous work emphasizes how left/right political choices reflect the basic 
cleavages in society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, argue for the importance of the 
religious and class (or economic) cleavage. A large part of the variation in the latter that explains 
party choice can be captured by an individual’s belief concerning three basic economic questions: 
beliefs concerning the role that individual needs should play in determining income, beliefs 
concerning the role of merit in determining income, and the beliefs concerning how desirable is 
private ownership of property.
16 
                                                 
16 The literature discussing the nature of political beliefs is vast (see, for example, de Tocqueville (1955), Lipset (1979), 
inter alia; see also the discussions in Rokeach (1973), Feldman (1988), Inglehart (1990) and Zaller (1991)). Beliefs are 
defined as the combination of the available information with a set of more stable individual values (that condition the 
acceptance/rejection of particular arguments). See Zaller (1991) for a recent discussion.   15
 
Table C2 uses a similar regression to the one above but with different dependent variables that 
capture these different dimensions of ideology. We start with the role of needs as captured by 
attitudes towards poverty. For ease of exposition we treat the variable Perception of Corruption as 
cardinal (assigning the value 1 to “almost no officials” and 4 to “almost all officials”). We also attach the 
letter R (L) if, in the natural interpretation, higher values are associated with a right wing (left wing) 
ideological placement. The dependent variables in the first three columns deal with attitudes towards 
poverty. Column (1) in Table C2 uses the answer to the question ”Why, in your opinion, are there people 
in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view?” The two relevant 
options are 1. They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, OR 2. They are poor because society treats 
them unfairly. The variable, which is called Not Lazy-L is positively associated with Perception of 
Corruption, suggesting that people who perceive corruption to be widespread are more likely to reject 
the idea that poverty is due to laziness in favor of the idea that the poor are unfairly treated by 
society, compared to those that do not think that corruption is widespread. 
 
Column (2) explores a different framing. It asks “In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a 
chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping?”  The two relevant answers are 1. They 
have a chance or 2. There is very little chance. Again those who perceive high levels of corruption also 
express a left wing view. Column (3) focuses on the question “Do you think that what the government is 
doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?” The relevant answers 
are 1. Too much or 2. About the right amount, or 3. Too little. It reveals that people who perceive 
corruption to be widespread are also more likely to say that the government is doing too little to 
alleviate poverty. This result is interesting for theories that see corruption arising from government 
intervention. One possibility is that individuals understand that the optimal intervention may be 
larger when the bureaucrats implementing them are corrupt, as there could be leaks. This is 
implausible and depends on there being no aversion to corruption per se.
17 Thus, the result in 
column (3) is consistent only with a sophisticated version of what Djankov et al (2002) call the 
"public interest" view and is inconsistent with the "tollbooth theory" where regulation is put into 
place to extract fees. 
 
                                                 
17 Ades and Di Tella (1997) call these "super-Pigouvian" interventions (see also Banerjee (1997), Acemoglu and Verdier 
(2000) and Djankov  et al (2003)). When there is aversion to corruption, “anti-Pigouvian” policies may be optimal.   16
Column (4) asks about beliefs concerning the role of merit in determining income (interpreting merit 
as payment in proportion to individual output). The dependent variable is the answer to "Imagine two 
secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than 
she does. The better-paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, is 
it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other?" Individuals who perceive corruption to be 
widespread are more likely to say that it is not fair to pay more to the more efficient secretary. 
 
Column (5) in Table C2 turns attention to individual beliefs concerning how desirable is private 
ownership of property. The dependent variable is the answer to the question, "There is a lot of 
discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your 
opinion? 1. The owners should run their business or appoint the managers; 2. The owners and the employees should 
participate in the selection of managers. 3. The government should be the owner and appoint the managers; 4. The 
employees should own the business and should elect the managers.” Individuals who perceive corruption to be 
widespread are also less likely to say that business should be managed in ways that are typical of 
capitalism. 
 
Columns (1b-5b) run a similar set of regressions, but also include the same set of personal 
characteristics used in Table C1. The results remain similar. 
 
III. Corruption and Ideological Orientation: Interpretation  
 
The patterns present in the data raise two broad questions. First, do the correlations uncovered in 
Tables C1-2 involve a causal effect? Second, if the effect is causal, what explains it? In other words, 
why do people turn left when they observe corruption? 
 
III.a. Causality 
There are two broad causal interpretations for the corruption-left correlation uncovered in Tables 
C1-2. First, it could reflect that observing corruption causes people to move left. Alternatively, it 
could reveal that observing corruption is a fixed left wing trait. Our research approach is not 
designed to deal with this issue convincingly, so a full investigation is left for future research.  
   17
One possibility we explored was to see if Perception of Corruption was correlated with other, non-
economic aspects of ideology. If there were no correlation, one could argue that observing 
corruption is not a general left wing trait (although it could still be an economic fixed trait). One 
problem we encountered reading the literature was that it was less clear what political scientists think 
are the core non-economic ideological beliefs. Some political scientists have argued for the 
increasing importance of values that emphasize a libertarian/authoritarian dimension as well as 
“post materialist” values that focus on quality of life (rather than economic preservation).
18 A recent 
example is a paper by Knutsen and Kumlin (2003), which identifies moral values (religious versus 
secular), libertarian/authoritarian and ecology versus growth orientation as the three central (non-
economic) values used in party choice. When we correlate Perception of Corruption with variables 
included in the World Values Survey to capture these categories, we get a mixed picture. For 
example, the moral core value of ideology is captured by asking “Please tell me if homosexuality can 
always be justified, never be justified or something in between”. The scale reveals that 1 equals “Never justifiable” 
while 10 equals “Always justifiable”. The correlation with Perception of Corruption is negative and, once 
personal controls are included, significant at the 1% level. People who perceive corruption to be 
widespread are more likely to report the standard right-wing answer (Never justifiable) not the left-
wing one (Always justifiable). This is contrary to what was found in Table C2 where economic 
attitudes were used. When we study the other variables available in the WVS capturing non-
economic attributes of ideology identified in previous work we obtain more mixed results (available 
upon request). 
 
A more formal approach is to compare the effect of corruption perceptions on right wing 
inclination under three different specifications. The first involves only one right-hand variable: 
Perception of Corruption. The second involves this variable, as well as the set of economic beliefs 
included in the WVS. And the third involves Perception of Corruption and the set of non-economic 
beliefs included in our data source. The coefficient on Perception of Corruption is unchanged when 
moving from the first to the third specification; whereas it is halved when we move from the first to 
the second specification (equality of the corruption effect on the first and second specifications is 
rejected at the 10% level). This is suggestive of the idea that part of the effect of corruption on 
ideology operates through its impact on economic beliefs. 
                                                 
18 See Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), Flanagan (1987), Kitschelt (1994), inter alia.  
   18
 
III.b. Two Interpretations 
From the point of view of the objectives of the paper, however, the ambiguity about causal effects is 
perhaps less worrying. The reason is that, even if there is a non-causal interpretation and left wingers 
just happen to see corruption everywhere, the evidence would still explain the findings in tables A 
and B. In particular, it would explain the main question in the paper, namely why capitalist rhetoric 
doesn’t flow to poor and corrupt countries. To see this, assume that a left and a right wing party 
compete for votes. The left wing rhetoric includes the word corruption whereas right leaning 
politicians never mention it.  Now assume that a shock increases the amount of corruption in the 
country. Voters that observe this will see that the left-wing politician was correct on this issue. Other 
things equal, this will make voters lean left. Thus, shocks that increase the perception of corruption 
would lead voters to choose left wing parties, and for capitalist ideas not to be adopted, even if the 
corruption-left connection is a fixed effect at the individual level. 
 
A more difficult challenge conceptually is to build a causal theory, whereby corruption is observed 
and people then turn left. We develop the notion that commercial institutions have to be 
“legitimate” as a mirror to the idea of legitimacy in government which has been discussed in the 
political science literature. Thus, the public decides to tax, regulate, monitor and control business 
according to how "deserving" they perceive them to be. Businesses, in turn, are more deserving the 
more they share the social norms of society, for example in terms of fairness and honesty, as well as 
the more productive they are. Before making these notions more precise in a model, we note some 
requirements that we impose on our explanation. First, as discussed in section II.c, it has to explain 
why an act of corruption turns the public against businesses when both business and bureaucrats 
have to be willing participants in such acts. Second, and also as discussed in section II.c., we ask that 
the predictions vary with the general level of intervention in the economy. Thus, corruption when 
intervention is heavy is less damaging to firms than when government intervention is low.  
 
Finally, historical examples suggest that we should ask the theory to account for the many historical 
cases in which right wing parties fail to convince voters that they will be tough on capitalists. An 
example of this is the failed presidential bid of novelist and liberal candidate Mario Vargas Llosa in 
Peru in 1990. His candidacy had everything one would expect is needed to achieve a “separation” 
between the right and bad capitalists (e.g., his wealth was not derived from contracts with the state).   19
A standard informal explanation is that people vote by emotional association.
19 Thus, voters in 
corrupt countries may emotionally associate the capitalist party with bad entrepreneurs, regardless of 
the policies the party proposes. This can be interpreted as a form of fairness motives in the utility 
function. Interestingly, an important case where separation between the pro-capitalist party and bad 
capitalists was achieved is Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency in the US. The standard account of how 
he achieved this appears to be consistent with a (variant) of fairness motivations as the need for 
regulating big business was connected to morality in some of his writings (see Morris (2001)). This 
episode suggests that when a second policy is available (punishment and regulation of the offending 
firms), other pro-business policies are possible. Note also that fairness helps explain the separation 
failure because it is based on previous information. Thus, voters are not attracted to a party that 
credibly promises to stop corruption from now on as what they want is someone that can reduce the 
payoff of the (corrupt) capitalists. In this view, capitalism can only succeed only after the bad 
capitalists are “punished”. On how laws conceive the corporation as a moral actor, see Rose-
Ackerman (2002). 
 
We propose a model where corruption reveals information about the type of capitalists in terms of 
how “fair” or deserving they are. (The working paper version of the paper develops a model based 
on rational preferences where capitalists have different productivities; available upon request). In it, 
the decision of the public to adjust bureaucratic wages is absent. This is done without serious loss of 
generality as long as in equilibrium technology (in particular monitoring ability) and distribution of 
preferences (moral costs) are such that it is not optimal for the public to set wages in such a way as 
to deter all forms of corruption. See Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1993). 
 
A Link between Corruption and Ideology based on Fairness Considerations 
The setup is a one shot “dictator” game augmented with a prior signal concerning the corruption of 
the capitalists and the bureaucrats. We consider only one broad policy available to voters. We 
assume a type of preferences that mean that workers do not fully confiscate the rich because they 
would regard that as “unfair” (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen (1991), Rabin (1993)). In particular 
individuals have “reciprocal preferences”, as in Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2002, 2003).  
 
                                                 
19 If capitalism in the past has been implemented by a ruthless dictator or by a colonial power, then voters in subsequent 
elections would find hard to push for pro-business capitalist policies.   20
Preferences 
Giving the subscripts b, f and v to variables corresponding to the bureaucrat, firm and worker 
respectively, and denoting by U  their material payoffs (i.e., their payoffs aside of any altruistic 
feelings) we define their preferences as 
 
v b b b U U W λ + =            ( 1 )  
v f f f U U W λ + =            ( 2 )  
( ) ( ) b b vb f f vf v v U U U W λ λ λ λ ˆ ˆ + + =          ( 3 )  
 
where  s λ  is a parameter denoting the unconditional level of altruism of the s=firm, bureaucrat   
towards the agent and  ( ) s vs λ λ ˆ  is the worker’s altruism, assumed to be an increasing function of  s λ ˆ , 
the worker’s best estimate of the firm’s (or bureaucrat’s) altruism.
20 Without loss of generality we 
assume that there are no altruistic feelings between firms and bureaucrats. This formulation assumes 
that workers would want to respond like with like. As stressed by the above authors, this function 
has to adopt some positive values in order to explain voluntary contributions in public goods 
experiments, and negative values in order to explain rejections of positive offers in ultimatum games. 
For the purposes of this application, it is sufficient to assume that it is an increasing function of  s λ ˆ . 
For simplicity, it is assumed that all firms (bureaucrats) have the same altruism parameter, which can 
take only two values,  { } {} 2 1,λ λ λ λ = ∈ sg s  (where  { } 2   , 1 ∈ g ). The ex ante probability that altruism is 
sg λ  is given by 
sg k  and is common knowledge. 
 
Government 
Individual workers are endowed with an amount R  of resources each period that is put into the 




                                                 
20 An alternative interpretation is that the perceived merits of the capitalists and bureaucrats drives the “altruism” of the 
worker, as in the Hoffman et al (1994) experiments where the property right of being the first mover is “earned” by 
scoring high in a general knowledge quiz and first movers with high scores exhibit more “self regarding” behavior.   21
Technology and Contracts 
There are an equal number of firms, bureaucrats and workers. Production by the firm yields  p . 
Firms keep  p f α , bureaucrats keep  p b α  while workers keep  p v α .
21 It is reasonable to assume 
that the bureaucrat’s material payoff is smaller than that of the firm’s. 
 
Corruption 
When the firm is honest and produces, the players receive their payoffs described in (1-3), which we 
now index with superscript “honest”, 
honest
s s W W = . When there is corruption they receive 
corrupt
s W . 





second term is a common moral cost that is privately observed (i.e., by the bureaucrat and the firm 
but not by the worker). Its distribution is common knowledge and is denoted  () m F .  
 
Timing 
At the beginning of the period all bureaucrat-firm-worker trios are formed and observe a signal on 
the level of corruption.
22 A worker then estimates  s λ ˆ  and decides a level of taxes that maximizes 
expected utility. Firms and bureaucrats find out the (common) value of the moral cost. They then 
produce or engage in corruption and output is shared.  
 
Results 
For a given level of taxes, it is possible to define a cutoff moral cost (for each altruism parameter) 
such that all firms with lower moral cost are corrupt. In other words, all firms for which  
 
() m R t p R U t p v v fg f − ≥ + + + − 2 / α λ α         ( 4 a )  
 
                                                 
21 A standard assumption is that bureaucrats derive an enjoyment from the size of the public sector. Note that this effect 
is already present in the model, arising indirectly since higher taxes increase the payoff to workers who bureaucrats care 
about. Thus, our results can also be derived assuming bureaucrats care directly about the size of the public sector by 
letting Ub =g(t) where g is an increasing function.  
22 In the repeated game version, this comes from observing income in the previous period. It has to be assumed that the 
probability that the worker is the median voter is sufficiently small so that firms ignore signaling (see Rotemberg (2003)).   22
produce, where  0 ) 0 ( = U  and Uf is assumed linear for simplicity. Otherwise they are corrupt. Call 
the level of m for which the equation above holds with equality, 
fg m . A similar logic determines 
bg m , the level of the moral cost that makes the bureaucrat indifferent between participating in the 
corrupt transaction or not. In other words: 
   
()
bg
v v bg b m R t p R U p − = + + + 2 / α λ α         ( 4 b )  
 
After observing corruption, the worker’s best estimate of the firm’s (bureaucrat's) altruism parameter 
is: 
 
( ) ( )
corruption s s corruption s s s z z 2 2 1 1 ˆ λ λ λ λ λ + =         ( 5 )  
 
where the values of  (.) z  are conditional probabilities. Note that for corruption to occur, both 
bureaucrat and firm need to be willing. Since the honest material payoff to the firm is higher than to 
the bureaucrat, the binding moral cost is always the firm’s (
fg m ) except when the difference in 
altruism is very large and a non-altruistic firm meets an altruistic bureaucrat (so 
2 1 b f m m > ). For the 
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sg sg




= λ         ( 6 )  
 
where  s=f. For the case where 
2 1 b f m m > , updating also occurs on the altruism level of the 
bureaucrat. Ignoring this case momentarily, the worker’s problem after observing the state r, where 
{} Honesty Corruption r , ∈ , is to set the level of taxes to maximize expected utility. 
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The first order condition is given by: 
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m F z λ λ λ λ λ   
(8) 
 
Equation (8) suggests that workers balance the income from taxes with their desire to be fair to 
firms and the “incentive” costs of high taxes (captured here through the size of the black economy). 
The following proposition can be established: 
 
Proposition 1:  
1.  The observation of corruption increases desired taxes on account of fairness considerations 
(as it reduces the belief that firms are altruistic towards workers). 
2.  Countries where firms are productive and government is small have less corruption 
3.  If the party of low taxes credibly promises to control corruption, its appeal may still be lower 
than that of the high tax party. 
4.  When taxes are high, corruption does not change the voter’s estimate of the firm’s altruism. 








corruption f k z < λ . Then, note that when fairness considerations dominate 
tax-setting, we have that  
Honesty Corruption t t
* * >  , where 
r v r EW t max arg
* =  (The FOC reduces to 







λ λ  as f→0 where the limit captures the importance of fairness relative to size-of-
the-shadow-economy considerations. Hence if corruption is observed,  ) ˆ ( f vf λ λ drops which implies 







To see 2., define a rich country as one that has a large 
R
p
. Calculate the total amount of corruption 
as  ( ) ∑
g









 for all g.   24
To see 3., note that having observed corruption, reciprocal preferences mandate higher taxes (first 
term in equation (8)). Since future corruption levels will be controlled, there are no incentive effects 
of higher taxes in terms of driving entrepreneurs into the shadow economy (and the second term 
drops out, reinforcing the effect).
23  
To see 4., note that  1 ) ( / ) ( lim
1 2 = →
f f
p t m F m F . 
To see 5., note that profits for an honest firm are lower after the worker observes a corrupt firm.  
 
To see that allowing 
2 1 b f m m >  does not affect our conclusions, note that  ) ( ) (
2 2 f b m F m F >  when 
the bureaucrat’s material payoff is smaller than the firm’s, so that the observation of corruption still 
leads to a smaller update on the bureaucrat type than on the firm’s type. 
# 
 
The intuition for the key result (the observation of corruption is more damaging to capitalists than 
to bureaucrats) is as follows. Firms dislike taxes. Bureaucrats like them (in our setup this occurs 
indirectly; see also footnote 21). An act of corruption means that both were, to some degree "unfair" 
towards workers. Why then react hurting one more than the other? First, there is the fact that voters 
get some of the tax receipts. Second, and more importantly, for a similar level of altruism, the 
bureaucrat is always ready to be corrupt because of the (assumption of) lower pay.  Thus, the act of 
corruption is more telling (i.e., induces a larger change in the posterior) on the firm's level of 
altruism. This predicts that a person that sees corruption amongst public officials as widespread will 
declare to dislike capitalists (the correlation between these two WVS questions is significant at the 1 
per cent level).
24 An alternative explanation is to exploit the natural distinction between extortion 
and capture. The distinction being that, by assumption, only bureaucrats misbehave under extortion 
whereas only firms misbehave in the case of capture. Then, if capture cases tend to involve better 
known actors from business and politics than extortion cases, they would tend to be covered more 
often in the media (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer (2002)) and to be more salient in the eyes of the 
public when they make their voting decisions.  
 
                                                 
23 This result is robust to modeling the incentive effects of taxes in more traditional ways (e.g., when incentive effects are 
derived from reduced individual effort rather than lower profit reporting).   25
The model emphasizes the idea of commercial legitimacy, whereby the income of business people 
has to be accepted by voters. This idea, which parallels the notion of legitimacy of government 
authority employed by political scientists, is summarized in the model by the degree of mutual 
respect (or reciprocal altruism) of the different members.
25 In particular, the main variable of interest 
(the level of taxation) is determined by a combination of self-interest, a sense of fairness towards 
others and an incentive constraint arising from the difficulty of producing output in a highly taxed 
economy.
26 This is related (but not identical) to a class of efficiency problems generated by high 
taxes that prevent the poor from fully taxing the rich. More precisely, in this model the main cost of 
taxes from the point of view of the voters is that firms hide more (i.e., join the unofficial economy). 
Formally this plays a similar role to having the standard efficiency costs of high taxes.
27 One 
advantage of the present set up is that voters update less when taxes are high, something that could 
capture the idea that corruption as more “justifiable” when taxes are high.  
 
A difficulty in the fairness models is that outcomes are judged according to how close they are to a 
target or “fair” outcome, but there is no natural way to define this. We follow Levine (1998) and 
Rotemberg (2002, 2003) in assuming that an agent’s feelings towards others are affected by what 
they believe others feel towards them. Thus, a bigger weight is put on money in the hands of an 
individual who is thought to be more altruistic. This naturally leads to a dynamic signaling game, as a 
player’s actions potentially reveal their altruism. While we wish to retain the basic notion of fairness, 
the idea that an individual firm will change their (secret) corrupt behavior to affect these perceptions 
is implausible, even if these secret acts sometimes get caught. The set up we analyze, a dictator game 
augmented to allow for a prior signal, reflects this (as in Hoffman et al (1994) and Ruffle (1998)). 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 This important aspect of the model where income differences between bureaucrats and capitalists drive the changes in 
beliefs against the richest actor can be taken as a metaphor for the differences in power that the two have (whereas in an 
extortion the powerful party is the bureaucrat). 
25 This formalizes the idea that “corporations have an obligation to refrain from illegal payoffs as part of the quid pro quo implied by the 
laws that permit corporations to exist and operate”, Rose-Ackerman (2002).  
26 As in work on why the poor do not expropriate the rich (e.g., Putterman (1996), Roemer (1998) and Benabou (2001)). 
Note that, even if efficiency considerations were absent, a sufficiently high desire for fair outcomes would bring about an 
interior solution. This is desirable given that the correlation between income inequality and taxation across rich countries 
is weak. Moreover, the multiple equilibria arising in previous models seeking to explain the economic systems in the US 
and Europe are rankable in terms of GDP (if not Pareto-rankable). See, for example, Piketty (1995), Benabou (2000), 
Alesina and Angeletos (2003). Note also that these considerations are secondary; we are ultimately more interested in the 
correlates of the equilibrium level of taxes than what this level is.  
27 See Johnson et al (2000), Svensson (2001) and Choi and Thum (2003). Extending the set up to include firm investment 
shows that corruption is more damaging than taxes (as long as moral costs are discovered after investments), consistent 
with the arguments in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (1997). An emphasis on tax evasion as a response to tax 
increases (e.g., versus labor supply responses) is consistent with the empirical evidence in Auerbach and Slemrod (1997).   26
 
Finally, there is an ideological externality in the sense that the individually rational acts of corrupt 
entrepreneurs lead to the belief that capitalists are un-deserving, hurting the rest of society (good 
entrepreneurs and workers). The profits of entrepreneurs are inter-dependent as corrupt acts give a 
bad name to capitalism and hurt good entrepreneurs (see Velasco and Tornell (1992) for a different 
type of externality in a model with interest groups). This result depends on the degree of correlation 
of altruism levels across capitalists that is assumed. This provides some justification for the 
preoccupation of corporations to have other firms adopt forms of corporate social responsibility. 




Our paper is made up of three parts. In the first, we explore anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
political rhetoric in developing countries is tilted to the left of the ideological spectrum. Thus, right-
wing rhetoric is less extreme in poor countries than in rich countries while the rhetoric of left-wing 
parties appears more extreme in poor countries than in rich countries. Overall, this suggests that US-
style, pro-capitalist political parties have electoral difficulties in the third world. We do not have 
formal systematic evidence on electoral rhetoric, but data on the ideological identification of political 
parties around the world from Beck et al (2001) is consistent with this view.  
 
In the main part of the paper we attempt to provide an explanation. Our conjecture is that 
corruption plays a role in shaping ideologies. The paper provides empirical evidence that is 
consistent with the hypothesis that corruption moves the electorate to the left. We discuss three 
types of evidence.  
1.  First, we argue that cross-country evidence showing that more regulation is correlated with 
more corruption (Djankov et al (2002)) is consistent with the idea that corruption reduces the 
appeal of capitalism (as well as with the “tollbooth” theory presented by these authors).  
2.  Second, we present evidence on a link at the aggregate level between corruption and 
ideology within countries. We show that there is a negative correlation between a country’s 
aggregate level of corruption and how much to the right is the government in later years 
(and there is no evidence of reverse Granger causality).    27
3.  Third, we look at data on beliefs across individuals within countries. We show that people 
who think that corruption amongst public officials is widespread in the country tend to 
report themselves on the left of the political spectrum. The effect is monotonically 
increasing in the perception of corruption, well defined statistically, and comparable in size 
with other determinants of left-wing preferences, such as being on low income. We partition 
ideology into economic and non-economic attributes of ideology, and document their 
correlation with perceptions of corruption. People who perceive there to be widespread 
corruption also tend to think that the government is doing too little to fight poverty or to 
think that the government should run firms (rather than owners and managers).  
 
In the third and final part of the paper, we discuss possible interpretations of these correlations. We 
ask that the model is consistent with three pieces of evidence, including that a) the corruption-left 
connection changes with a history of heavy government intervention in the country, b) corruption 
of all kinds (i.e., both of the capture and of the extortion variety) turn people away from capitalism, 
and c) even right-wing parties that credibly promise to control corruption often have electoral 
difficulties (i.e., there is failure to separate bad capitalists from right wing parties). The root 
assumption of the model is that voters are willing to pay to punish people who are of the "unfair" 
type (as in the ultimatum game). Bayesian updating after an act of corruption, is more unfavorable to 
capitalists (than to bureaucrats) because they are richer. Thus, even if we do not exploit the 
distinction between extortion (corruption initiated by bureaucrats which hurts firms) and capture 
(corruption initiated by firms for their benefit), the model can still explain why corruption hurts 
capitalists more than bureaucrats. The existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs 
by reducing the general appeal of capitalism. Accordingly, perhaps the most important message of 
the model is that it points out that corrupt entrepreneurs can have a negative effect on all 
entrepreneurs by undermining the electorate's faith in markets. A limitation of our model is that 
good entrepreneurs and the public have no way of disciplining corrupt entrepreneurs. In practice 
there may be ways of making these entrepreneurs internalize the costs of their actions (perhaps 
through judicial prosecution or through social norms). 
 
Overall, the paper shows that corruption has an ideological side to it. Increases in corruption 
adversely influence the electoral performance of pro-capitalist parties.   28
Appendix 1: Results  
 
Table A1: Frequency of Political Color of Government by Income  
 
  Top income (1st)  Middle Income (2nd)   Bottom Income (3rd) 
     
Left  244 (37.7 %)  290 (45.0 %)  436 (67.6 %) 
     
Center  78 (12.1 %)  59 (9.2 %)  62 (9.6 %) 
     
Right  325 (50.2 %)  295 (45.8 %)  147 (22.8 %) 
     
Total  647 (100 %)  644 (100 %)  645 (100 %) 
Note: Frequencies of government (definition used is "largest government party") for 136 countries over the period 1975 
to 1997. Percentiles within income group in parentheses.  
 
Table A2: Frequency of Political Color, Beginning and End of the Sample Period. 
 
1975-80  Top income (1st)  Middle Income (2nd)   Bottom Income (3rd) 
      
Left  65 (44.2 %)  69 (50.4 %)  73 (67.6 %) 
Center  21 (14.3 %)  10 (7.3 %)  7 (6.5 %) 
Right  61 (41.5 %)  58 (42.3 %)  28 (25.9 %) 
      
Total 1975-80  147 (100 %)  137 (100 %)  108 (100 %) 
1992-97  Top income (1st)  Middle Income (2nd)   Bottom Income (3rd) 
      
Left  68 (36.1 %)  92 (40.2 %)  143 (64.7 %) 
Center  14 (7.5 %)  23 (10.0 %)  34 (15.4 %) 
Right  106 (56.4 %)  114 (49.8 %)  44 (19.9 %) 
      
Total 1992-97  188 (100 %)  229 (100 %)  221 (100 %) 
Note: Same as Table A1 above.  
 
Table A3: Political Color of Government: Three Alternative Definitions  
 Chief  Executive  Largest Government 
Party 
3 Main  
Government Parties 
     
Richest (Top Third)  0.13 0.13 0.11 
     
Poorest (Bottom Third)  -0.44 -0.45 -0.42 
     
t-statistic  11.4 11.6 11.8 
significance  <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
Note: Averages are obtained assigning value 1 to the right wing party, 0 to the center party and -1 to the left wing 
party. t-statistic refers to the difference in means test between Top Third and Bottom Third. 
   29
Table A4: Frequency of Political Color, by Income and Inequality Levels 
    Top income (1st)  Bottom Income (3rd) 
      
  Left  111 (44 %)    43 (96 %) 
Low Inequality  Center    24 (10 %)  0 (0 %) 
  Right  116 (46 %)    2 (4 %) 
      
  Total   251 (100 %)  45 (100 %) 
      
    Top income (1st)  Bottom Income (3rd) 
      
  Left  19 (27 %)  68 (58 %) 
High Inequality  Center  24 (34 %)  8 (7 %) 
  Right  27 (39 %)  42 (35 %) 
      
  Total   70 (100 %)  118 (100 %) 
Note: Political color defined with color of Largest Government Party. Top (Bottom) Income denotes that the country 
is in the richest third of the sample Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, Deininger and Squire (1996). 
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R
2 overall  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.05  0.06 
Number of observations  662  694  694  654  664 
Notes: [1] Standard errors in brackets. Bold-face denotes significant at 10 per cent level, starred-bold at 5 percent level, 
double-starred bold at 1 per cent level. [2] In column (1) Chief executive is a variable that takes value -1 if chief executive is 
left wing, 0 if center, 1 if right wing. Column (2) same but uses orientation of largest government party and column (3) 
that of the 3 main government parties. The column (4) dependent variable measures the proportion of seats of the 
largest party in government and multiplies it by -1 if the party is left wing, 0 if center and 1 if right wing. Column (5) 
does the same but is an average across the orientation of each of the 3 main government parties. [3] Middle (center third) is 
a dummy denoting if real (PPP) income is in the centre-third of the sample, Poorest (bottom third) is a dummy denoting if it 
lies in the poorest one-third of the sample. The base category is the top third of incomes. Freedom rates political rights on 
a scale from 1 (least rights) to 7 (most rights). War is defined as a civil war of over 1,000 battle deaths per year. Inequality 
is measured by the Gini coefficient. See Appendix 2 for more information about these variables.   30
 
 














Party - Seats 
(5) 
3 Main Gov’t 
Parties - Seats
         






  -0.05** 
(0.02) 
  -0.05** 
(0.02) 
          
         
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
         
Adjusted R
2 0.66  0.69  0.67  0.75  0.74 
Number of observations  843  843  843  843  843 
Notes: [1] Regressions are OLS with country fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets. Bold-face denotes significant 
at 10 per cent level, starred-bold at 5 percent level, double-starred bold at 1 per cent level. [2] In Column (1) Chief 
executive is a variable that takes value -1 if chief executive is left wing, 0 if center, 1 if right wing. Column (2) same but 
orientation of largest government party and column (3) that of the 3 main government parties. Column (4) 
dependent variable measures the proportion of seats of the largest party in government and multiplies it by -1 if the 
party is left wing, 0 if center and 1 if right wing. Column (5) does the same but is an average across the orientation of 
each of the 3 main government parties. See Appendix 2 for more information about these variables. [3]Corruption is 
the ICRG corruption measure. (t-3) indicates the variable has been lagged by three years. See the Appendix for more 
information. 
 Table C1: Corruption Perceptions and Ideology 
Dependent Variable: Right Wing Voter  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Perception of Corruption   - Few officials  -0.03 -0.04 -0.01
                 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)
                                   - Most officials    -0.07**   -0.09**  -0.04
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)
                                   - Almost all officials   -0.13**  -0.14**  -0.07*
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)
Captured      -0.13**
  (0.01)
Personal Income Quintile  - Second  -0.03*   -0.03*
  (0.02)  (0.02)
                                    - Third  -0.004 -0.01
  (0.02)  (0.02)
                                    - Fourth   0.05*  0.04
  (0.02)  (0.02)
         - Fifth (top)     0.13**      0.13**
  (0.02)  (0.02)
Work Status        -  Unemployed  -0.01 -0.01
  (0.02)  (0.02)
                          - Self employed     0.10**      0.10**
  (0.02)  (0.02)
                          - Retired    -0.06**     -0.06**
   (0.02)  (0.02)
                          - Student  0.05  0.04
  (0.03)  (0.03)
                          - Housewife     0.09**      0.08**
  (0.02)  (0.02)
Marital status       - Married  0.02 0.02
  (0.02)  (0.02)
                          - Divorced  0.002 -0.01
  (0.03)  (0.03)
                          - Separated  -0.01 -0.02
  (0.04)  (0.04)
                          - Widowed     0.07**   0.07*
  (0.03)  (0.03)
Age    -0.01**     -0.01**
  (0.002)  (0.002)
Squared Age     1e-4**       1e-4**
  (3e-5)  (3e-5)
Male      0.03**       0.03**
  (0.01)  (0.01)
Age Finished School    -5e-3**     -4e-3**
  (8e-4)  (9e-4)
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes
No of Observations  51,810 37,278 34,961
Pseudo R2  0.02  0.02 0.02 
Note: [1] Regressions are ordered probits. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold is significant at 10% level; Single-star bold 
at 5% level; Double-star bold at 1% level. Cut points (standard errors) for col. (1) are: c1=-1.6 (0.1), c2=-1.2 (0.1), c3=-0.8 
(0.1), c4=-0.5 (0.1), c5=0.4 (0.1), c6=0.7 (0.1), c7=1.0 (0.1), c8=1.4 (0.1), c9=1.6 (0.1). Cut points for col. (2): c1=-2.1 (0.1), 
c2=-1.8 (0.1), c3=-1.4 (0.1), c4=-1.1 (0.1), c5=-0.3 (0.1), c6=0.1 (0.1), c7=0.4 (0.1), c8=0.8 (0.1), c9=1.0 (0.1). Cut points 
for col. (3): c1=-1.4 (0.1), c2=-1.1 (0.1), cut3=-0.7 (0.1), c4=-0.4 (0.1), cut5=0.5 (0.1), cut6=0.9 (0.1), c7=1.2 (0.1), c8=1.5 
(0.1), c9=1.8 (0.1) [2] Dependent variable is answer to question: In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How 
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Interviewer shows scale with numbers 1 to 10 written down with the 
word ‘Left’ below 1 and ‘Right’ below 10 [3] Perception of Corruption is a set of dummies corresponding to answers to the 
question: How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? 1. Almost no public officials are engaged in it 2. A few 
public officials are engaged in it 3. Most public officials are engaged in it 4. Almost all public officials are engaged in. [4] Captured is a dummy 
equal to 1 when respondent answers the second option to the question: Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run 
by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or is run for the benefit of all the people? 1. Run for all the people 2. Run by a few big interests.Table C2: Corruption Perceptions and Economic Attributes of Ideology 
 
Needs/Poverty Merits Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Dep. Variable has L (R) extension if 
higher numbers mean more Left (right) 
Not Lazy-L Escape-L  Govern. 
Poor-L  Fair Pay-L  Business 
Own-L 
          
Perception of Corruption   0.15**  0.25** 0.33**  0.14** 0.05** 
1= almost no official  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
4= almost all officials           
        
Personal Controls  No  No No  No No 
        
No of Observations  52,446  58,180 55,103 58,810 56,873 
Pseudo Rsq  0.098  0.111 0.105 0.079 0.041 
   
  (1b)  (2b)  (3b) (4b) (5b) 
           
Perception of Corruption  0.17**  0.26** 0.37**  0.13** 0.05* 
1= almost no official  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
4= almost all officials        
        
Personal Controls  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
        
No of Observations  37,864  43,673 39,995 44,392 41,184 
Pseudo Rsq  0.087  0.110 0.114 0.092 0.049 
Note: [1] Name of dependent variable has L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right) [2] All regressions 
are Ordered Probits and include country dummies [3] Standard errors in parentheses [4] Single-starred bold-face at 5 per 
cent level; Double-starred bold face at 1 percent level. [5] Perception of Corruption is the cardinal version of the question 
defined in the note to Table C1. [6] Dependent variables are the answers to the questions:  
Now I'd like you some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries:  
Column (1) Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which 
comes closest to your view?  1. They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or 2.They are poor 
because society treats them unfairly. 
Column (2) In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is 
very little chance of escaping?  1. They have a chance or 2. There is very little chance.  
Column (3) Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right 
amount, too much, or too little? 1. Too much or 2. About the right amount, or 3. Too little.  
Column (4) Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns 
considerably more than she does. The better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more 
reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? 1. Fair or 
2. Not fair. 
Column (5) There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four 
statements comes closest to your opinion?  
1.  The owners should run their business or appoint the managers 
2.  The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers. 
3.  The government should be the owner and appoint the managers 
4.  The employees should own the business and should elect the managers. 
Columns (1b-5b) run the same set of regressions, but also controlling for the identical set of personal characteristics 
included in Table C1. See Appendix 2.   33
Appendix 2: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Country Level Surveys and Variables 
Survey Descriptions 
The ideology variables Right, Left and Center, are defined by Beck et al in two steps. First, they identify the 
party of key political players. Then they asked whether the orientation of a party (regarding greater or less 
state control of the economy) was immediately obvious from the name. Otherwise they checked sources, 
including The Europa Handbook and Banks’ Political Handbook of the World. Information on party orientation 
comes from Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East: A Reference Guide (1993), Political Parties of Eastern 
Europe, Russia and the Successor States: A Reference Guide (1994) and the Web site maintained by Agora Telematica 
(www.agora.stm.it/elections/parties.htm). Countries: Afghanistán, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoro 
Islands, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, East Germany, West Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, USSR, Spain, Sri Lanka, St 
Lucia, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, USA, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. 
 
Variables 
Right: Parties on the right are those with the terms “conservative” or “Christian democratic” in their names, 
or are labeled right-wing in their sources.  
Left: Similarly, parties classified as left if their names reveal them to be communist, socialist, or social 
democratic or if the sources label them as left-wing.  
Center: Similarly, centrist parties are those called centrist by their sources or if their proposed policies can best 
be described as centrist (e.g., because the party advocates strengthening private enterprise but also 
supports a redistributive role for government).  
Chief Executive: A discrete variable that refers to the political orientation of the party of the chief political 
decision-maker in the country. Assigned three numerical codes: -1 if the Chief Executive is left wing, 0 
if center and 1 if right wing.  
Largest Government Party: A discrete variable that refers to the political orientation of the Governing party with 
most seats in the legislature. It is assigned three numerical codes: -1 if the largest government party is 
left wing, 0 if center and 1 if right wing.  
Largest Government Party  (by seats): A continuous variable capturing the political orientation of the largest 
Governing party as above, but now weighted by the proportion of seats it occupies in the legislature. 
Three Main Government Parties: The political orientation of the government parties with the first, second and 
third largest number of seats in the legislature, obtained by taking a simple average across the political 
orientation of each of these parties. The government parties are assigned three numerical codes: -1, 0 
and 1 depending on whether they are left, center or right-wing assigned equal weights. 
Three Main Government Parties (by seats): A continuous variable capturing the political orientation of the three 
largest government parties as above, but where each one is weighted by the number of seats it 
occupies in the legislature. 
Freedom: A scale from 1 to 7 measuring the extent of political rights. Nations with a rating of 7 come closest 
to the ideals of free and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or 
other political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Nations 
with the lowest numbers have systems ruled by military juntas, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. A   34
rating of 1 means political rights are virtually nonexistent. The data is produced in an annual survey 
produced by regional experts, consultants, and human rights specialists. Source Freedom House.  
War: A dummy variable equal to one when there is a civil war in that country/year. A civil war is defined as a 
domestic conflict involving of over 1,000 battle deaths per year. From Doyle and Sambanis (2000). 
Inequality: The Gini Ratio, obtained from the Deininger and Squire (1996) World Bank “high quality” data set. 
Corruption: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index has been produced annually since 
1982 by Political Risk Services, a private international investment risk service. It is measured on a 0 
to 6 scale. The index is based on the opinion of experts, and intends to capture the extent to which 
“high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans”. 
GDP per head: GDP per capita, in 1992 US$, from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
 
Individual Level Surveys and Variables: 
Survey Descriptions 
World Values Survey and European Values Survey (Third wave: 1995-7). The Combined World Values 
Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. The series is designed for 
cross-national comparison of values and norms. Both national random and quota sampling were used. All of 
the surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult 
citizens, aged 18 and older. The countries surveyed in the 1995-7 wave which have data on both corruption 
and ideology include: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, 
India, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Moscow, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Andalusia, Basque, Galicia, Valencia, 




Right Wing Voter: Dependent variable is the answer to the question "In political matters, people talk of "the left" 
and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" Interviewer shows scale 
with numbers 1 to 10 written down with the word “Left” written below the number 1 and the word 
“Right” below the number 10 (World Values Survey). 
Perception of Corruption: A categorical variable that is the answer to the question “How widespread do you think 
bribe taking and corruption is in this country?”. The answers are (1) Almost no public officials are engaged in it. 
(2) A few public officials are engaged in it. (3) Most public officials are engaged in it. (4) Almost all public officials 
are engaged in it (World Values Survey). 
Captured: A dummy equal to 1 when the respondent gives the second answer to the question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for 
the benefit of all the people?” (1) Run for all the people (2) Run by a few big interests (World Values Survey). 
Personal Income Quintile: This heading refers to a set of 4 dummy variables which take the value 1 depending on 
which income quintile the respondent’s family income belongs to. The base category is the lowest 
income quintile (World Values Survey). 
Work Status: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the respondent’s employment status: 
“Unemployed”, “Self-employed”, “Retired”, “Student” or “Housewife”. The base category is 
“Employed” (World Values Survey). 
Marital Status: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the respondent’s marital status: 
“Married”, “Divorced”, “Separated” or “Widowed”. The base category is “Never Married” (World 
Values Survey). 
Age: The respondent’s age in years (World Values Survey). 
Male: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise (World Values Survey). 
Age Finished School: The age at which the respondent finished full-time education (World Values Survey).   35
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